105
J82ph
vol.1

VOL. 1. NO. 1. JANUARY 7, 1904

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE.

WHENEVER a new scientific journal appears, we are accustomed to take it as a sign that somewhere in the scholarly universe a new branching off has begun, a scientific specialty has undergone a new bifurcation. Interest in such a new herald is naturally confined to the few who work in the rising subspecialty. The banner, however, which this new journal is to unfold is of a very different nature. This journal does not protest against the spirit of specialization which makes our modern science and scholarship solid and strong, but it does protest against the prejudice that a detached specialization can give us the last word and can make correlations superfluous. It desires to stand for the unity of knowledge, aims to consider the fundamental conceptions which bind together all the specialistic results, seeks to enquire into the methods of science which bind together the scientific workers, and into the center of its sphere it puts philosophy. But all this seems, after all, merely a symptom of the whole spirit of our times. A reaction against the narrowness of mere fact-diggers has set in. A mere heaping up of disconnected, unshaped facts begins to disappoint the world; it is felt too vividly that a mere dictionary of phenomena, of events and laws, makes our knowledge larger but not deeper, makes our life more complex but not more valuable, makes our science more difficult but not more harmonious. Our time longs for a new synthesis, and looks toward science no longer merely with a desire for technical prescriptions and new inventions in the interest of comfort and exchange. It waits for knowledge to fulfill its higher mission, to satisfy our ideal needs for a view of the world which shall give unity to our scattered experience. The indications of this change are visible to every one who observes the gradual turning to philosophical discussions in the most different fields of scientific life. When after the first third of the nineteenth century the great philosophic movement, which found its climax in Hegelianism, came to disaster in consequence of its absurd neglect of hard solid facts, the era of natural-

ism began its triumph with contempt for all philosophy. Idealism and philosophy were stigmatized as the enemies of true science, and natural science had its great day. The rapid progress of physics and chemistry fascinated the world and produced modern technique; the sciences of life, physiology, biology, medicine, followed; and the scientific method was carried over from body to mind and gave us, at the end of the nineteenth century, modern psychology and sociology. The lifeless and the living, the physical and the mental, the individual and the social, all had been conquered by the analytic method, and the pseudo-philosophic positivism had served as a kind of substitute for a metaphysical view. But just when the climax had been reached and all had been analyzed and explained, the time was ripe for disillusion, and the lack of philosophy began to be felt with alarm in every quarter. For seventy years there had been nowhere so much philosophizing going on as suddenly sprung up among the scientists of the last decade. The physicists and the mathematicians, the chemists and the biologists, the geologists and the astronomers; and on the other side, the historians and the economists, the psychologists and the sociologists, the jurists and the theologians—all suddenly found themselves again in the midst of discussions on fundamental principles and methods, on general categories and conditions of knowledge; in short, in the midst of the despised philosophy. And with those discussions has come the demand for correlation. Everywhere have arisen leaders who have brought unconnected sciences together and emphasized the unity of large divisions. The time seems to have come again when the realistic wave is ebbing and a new idealistic tide is swelling, just as they have alternated in the civilization of three thousand years. To devote a new journal to this effort to bring together the sciences, psychology and philosophy, to emphasize the philosophic side of science and the true scientific value of philosophy, means, therefore, to understand and to appreciate the signs of a time which works toward a new synthesis of knowledge.

If this is the spirit of the new journal, I welcome the invitation to speak in the columns of its first issue on a great American undertaking of international scope, which aims at somewhat the same ideal and hopes to reenforce the synthetic spirit in a different way. The external plans of the International Congress of Arts and Science to be held in St. Louis from the nineteenth to the twenty-fifth of September, 1904, in connection with and on the invitation of the World's Fair, may be supposed to be familiar now to the scholars of the country. To all that the papers and magazines have reported concerning the general program, the selection of foreign speakers, the invitation to Europeans by the members of the Organizing

Committee, and a wide acceptance on their part, it may be added to-day that further important steps have been taken during the last few weeks. For American speakers and sectional chairmen, about 340 Americans have been selected, and invitations will soon be extended to them. All this has been done with the hearty cooperation of the great body of scientific men of this country. The president and the two vice-presidents of the congress, Professor Newcomb, Professor Small and I, had asked in November for advice from the council members of eighty societies of national scope, and from all sides authoritative suggestions were kindly furnished. In December, then, we three prepared, on the basis of this rich material, the list of invitations, and its final shape was voted by the Administrative Board with President Butler in the chair, President Harper, President Pritchett, President Jesse, Librarian of Congress Putnam, and as representative of the World's Fair, the Director of Congresses, Howard J. Rogers, being present. We gladly followed the propositions of the official representatives of the great societies; and yet we had no right to take them otherwise than as the suggestions for which alone we had asked, inasmuch as many secondary points of view—a fair distribution between different parts of the country, between different institutions, between different groups, had carefully to be considered. If the Americans accept the invitations in the next few months with the same readiness and willingness which the Europeans have shown, we can expect that the World's Fair will see in that September week a gathering of the most eminent scholars of the world and a work of incomparable value for the unity of the knowledge of our time.

Of course, no one dreams that the great synthetic apperception, for which our modern time seems ripe, will come through the delivery of 500 addresses, the discussions of 200 audiences, or the printing of papers by hundreds of authors. An ultimate unity demands the gigantic thought of a single genius, and the work of the many can after all be merely the preparation for the final work of the one. And yet history shows that the one will never come if the many have not done their share. That which is needed is to fill the sciences of our time with a growing consciousness of belonging together, with a longing for fundamental principles, with a conviction that the desire for correlation is not the fancy of dreamers, but the immediate need of the leaders in thought. What can the congress do to help in this preparatory work, and what has it done?

To begin at the beginning, the International Congress will represent the totality of sciences. We all know very well that specialistic work is best fostered if the representatives of one specialty are left alone in their meetings, and that a quiet place is the right resort

for them. Such meetings go on everywhere all the year round, and the World's Fair would be the worst background for them. But the place where the nations gather with their arts and industries is not bad headquarters when we try to bring all sciences together. And such an end can not be reached if, as in Paris, merely a long list of successive congresses is provided. One single congress, meeting at one time, could alone hold together the totality of intellectual endeavors. But above all, every striving for truth ought to find its place in the program, the applied practical sciences as well as the theoretical ones, the mental as well as the natural sciences. The special danger was that the prejudices left over from the anti-philosophical past might hinder the acknowledgment of those sciences whose material does not fall under the categories of causality. All the historical sciences and normative sciences would, in that case, be forced into the framework of biology, psychology and sociology; but also here all one-sidedness was avoided and a program worked up which prepares the way to a real philosophical unity by doing full justice to the teleological aspects of reality. We came thus to the establishment of 129 sections of similar extent.

But the synthetic purpose could not have been fulfilled if these different sections had been simply set beside each other. The related sections had to be grouped into departments. We distinguished twenty-four such departments. The related departments had to be grouped into divisions; we have seven such divisions, of which the first four, the Normative Sciences, the Historical Sciences, the Physical Sciences, the Psychical Sciences, form the first chief part—Theoretical Knowledge; while the last three divisions, the Utilitarian Sciences, the Regulative Sciences, and the Cultural Sciences, form the second chief part—Applied Knowledge. But this classification into divisions, departments and sections could become living only when the work itself should become in a way a dramatic realization of such a plan. Thus our first meeting will be devoted to the totality of knowledge. On the first afternoon the whole will resolve itself into the seven divisions. On the second day the seven divisions will divide into the twenty-four departments. And on the next five days the departments will branch out into the 129 sections, of which each one will take either an entire morning or an entire afternoon, thus making it possible for every one to attend the meetings of nine sections—enough to cover, probably, the whole sphere of his related interests.

More important is the choice of subjects for the leading addresses. Each department and each section will have as its chief contribution two addresses. No one of the 320 speakers invited to give the leading essays will simply follow his own specialistic interests, but will

accept or decline the invitation to deal with a definite topic which is an organic part of the whole undertaking. The speakers for each division will deal with the unity of that divisional field. Each department will devote the first address to the historical aspect of its subject, dealing with the development of the sciences of the whole department during the nineteenth century; while the second address will consider the fundamental conceptions and methods of the whole department. All the divisional and departmental speakers will be Americans; the work of the first two days will thus be the contribution of this country in welcome. On the third day, with the opening of the sections, begins the international work. Americans will be chairmen in all sections, and in nearly every section one of the two addresses will be delivered by Americans. The first sectional address will deal with the relation of that science to allied sciences; the second with the leading problems of our time. But in every section there will be, besides these two fundamental addresses, five or six shorter communications on invitation from the chairman; and while the topics of these are not prescribed, the tendency here too will be to emphasize the wider aspect. It is clear that such a system, by the topics of the addresses alone, thus forces the speakers to weave an intellectual network, making the sciences conscious of their interrelations, their fundamental problems, and their contributions to the totality of social consciousness. And all this will go on record in printed form. Twenty-four volumes, each one devoted to one department and its sections, will reenforce this powerful movement.

But the most essential condition of success is the choice of speakers and chairmen. To speak on the general aspects of a subject is in a way the easiest possible task. If a beginner tries it—and it attracts every beginner—he feels confident because he believes that his lack of mastery can be better hidden than in the discussion of special facts, where ignorance at once becomes evident. But every one knows also how utterly useless the undertaking in such a case must be. To approach the general problem in a helpful, original spirit is, on the other hand, a most difficult task, for which only those are prepared who have devoted a life of faithful service to the most various specialized subjects. The selection of scholars, in whose judgment on general problems the specialistic authorities confide, has thus been the very first condition of the plan. Only those men ought to be in question who have reached, by hard climbing alone, a height from which it is possible to take a bird's-eye view. This country does not lack such leaders, and the American instinct for organization and correlation and cooperation has always been favorable to the development of wide interests. The galaxy of American

speakers and chairmen will give an impressive idea of the breadth and strength and unity of the New World's thought. All indications justify the hope that the list of those who will take part will not be less imposing than the list of those who will receive invitations. But inasmuch as most of the calls are not yet out, it would be unbecoming to mention any names at this hour. It is not the same, however, with the Europeans to whom the invitations were personally conveyed last fall, by the organizing committee, and with whom the negotiations are, for the most part, closed.

For the 129 sections, 122 foreigners, about two thirds of those who have been approached officially, have definitively accepted the invitation. With a few others negotiations are pending. There are a few sections, like American History and others, for which we did not seek foreign speakers, and a number of other sections for which we gave both sectional addresses to Europeans, inasmuch as Americans had an exclusive right to the divisional and departmental speeches. It would lead too far to analyze the whole foreign list, but it may be in order to point here at least to those sections which fall most directly into the narrower circle of this journal. The department of philosophy has been divided into the following sections: metaphysics, philosophy of religion, logic, methodology of science, ethics, philosophy of law, esthetics. The department of psychology has been divided into the four sections: general psychology, experimental psychology, comparative psychology and abnormal psychology. The following Europeans will give leading addresses in these eleven sections: in metaphysics, Bergson, from Paris; in philosophy of religion, Pfleiderer, from Berlin, and Troeltsch, from Heidelberg; in logic, Riehl from Halle, and Windelband from Heidelberg; in methodology of science, Ostwald from Leipzig, and Erdmann from Bonn; in ethics, Sorley from Cambridge; in philosophy of law, Binding from Leipzig; in esthetics, Lipps from Munich, and Dessoir from Berlin; in general psychology, Hoeffding from Copenhagen; in experimental psychology, Ebbinghaus from Breslau; in comparative psychology, Lloyd Morgan from Bristol; in abnormal psychology, Pierre Janet from Paris. Now add to this list of European philosophers and psychologists who make leading addresses the names of Americans such as Baldwin, Bowne, Cattell, Dewey, Duncan, Hall, Howison, James, Ladd, Ormond, Pace, Palmer, Royce, Sanford, Shurmann, Thilly, Titchener, Tufts, Woodbridge and about ten more, all of whom will receive invitations, and the weight of this international combination must be strongly felt by every one who has the slightest knowledge of philosophical and psychological literature. And yet it is clear that the circle of those foreigners, for instance, whose presence and whose work would in-

terest the philosophers and psychologists is not at all confined to those who are booked officially for these sections only, but includes many brilliant men who will speak in related sections, but who probably will add shorter communications also in those sections mentioned. The psychologists, for instance, will feel no less interest in men like Lombroso from Turin, who comes for criminology; or Simmel of Berlin, and Toennies from Kiel, both of whom come for social psychology in the department of sociology; or Ziehen from Halle, who comes for psychiatry; or Erb from Heidelberg, in the section of neurology; or Waldeyer from Berlin in anatomy; or Engelmann from Berlin in physiology; or Manouvrier from Paris in somatology; or Ziegler from Strassburg, or Sadler from Manchester, or Rein from Jena, all of whom come for education. On the other hand, those interested in logic and methodology of science will greet with enthusiasm the great mathematicians, Picard and Darboux and Poincaré, all three from Paris, together with Boltzmann from Vienna; or naturalists of such philosophic temper as Mendeleef of St. Petersburg, or Dewar of London, Thompson of Cambridge, Van't Hoff of Berlin, Becquerel of Paris, Hertwig of Berlin, Giard of Paris, and many others. The philosopher interested in esthetics will welcome in the department of literature and art men like Furtwaengler of Munich, Muther of Breslau, Minor of Vienna, Enlart, Michel, Brunetière, all three of Paris. Those interested in philosophy of religion will hear men like Harnack of Berlin, Oldenberg of Kiel, Budde of Marburg, and many others. In short, wherever the center of individual interests may lie, every one will find that in his own circle the most brilliant names can be found. It is perhaps not too much to say that there will cross the ocean the leading economists and historians, the foremost philologians and naturalists, the greatest jurists and physicians, engineers and theologians; and everywhere the noblest American energies will assist them.

But the associations which cling to these famous names suggest exactly the type of thought to which the whole undertaking is devoted. Almost every one of these European scholars has in his own field brought about a certain synthesis of widely separated elements of thought, and has devoted not the smallest part of his work to the fundamental conceptions and methods of his science. The addresses which they will deliver thus lie essentially in the line of their own best thought, and yet it is most probable that the greater part of these addresses would never have been written had not the outer occasion of our invitation stimulated them to undertake the task. Such work is too easily postponed. And thus the congress may hope to create in these hundreds of addresses a connected and

consistent work which no chance group of individuals would have produced, which demanded a unified program and the enthusiasm of the leading thinkers of the world. But we hope that still more important than the set addresses will be the living influence of this gathering, in which the four or five hundred invited official speakers and chairmen, together with the thousand who may make shorter communications, will form merely the nucleus of the international meeting. That such a unique fusion of scholarship will be productive in itself no one can doubt; but that these scholars are brought together and are doing their work under the control of the demand for unity in knowledge, for interrelation and synthesis:—this thought will be the living force, the most powerful factor of the Congress, and a tremendous influence in overcoming the pedantic and unphilosophic narrowness of specialists in every corner of the realm of science.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AS ONTOLOGICAL.[1]

THE study of religion as a historical development has for its principal problem to trace the rise and evolution of the conception of Divine Being, and of the relations which this Being sustains to nature and to the human race. The lowest stage of religious belief seems to be a kind of naïve, vague and unreflective spiritism. This belief attaches itself to a motley group of invisible spiritual powers, some of which are ill-disposed, and some more kindly, toward man; but all of which are mysterious in nature and more or less capricious in conduct. But under the influence of political and social changes, and by means of the reflective thinking and insight of a few, a more definitely anthropomorphic conception of the gods, and of their relations to man, is formed; and yet later, but chiefly in dependence upon the teaching of religious thinkers, reformers or 'founders' of religion—'men of revelation'—monotheism appears. In its purest form, this highest development of the religious consciousness first took place, upon a basis common to the Semitic religions, among the Jews; but it is Christianity which preeminently stands for the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, as well as the 'Ground' of the world and of human life. Considered from the empirical point of view, this process may be described as man's making of the Divine Being after the pattern of the constantly improving image of man.

The study of the same phenomena from the psychological point of view shows us how the impulsive and emotional nature of man

[1] Brief abstract of a chapter in a treatise on the philosophy of religion.

has cooperated with his intellectual curiosity to arouse and guide imagination and intellect in their efforts to construct a worthy conception of God. In a word, the psychology of religions shows us what stimuli have excited, and what activities have been employed in, the task of forming the idea of the Object of religious belief and worship. This psychological study of religion, too, has for its problem the construction, by the human mind, of a conception of the Divine Being in a form to satisfy man's eudæmonistic, intellectual, esthetical and moral needs. It shows us why, and how, man makes God in his own (man's) image.

But now, the notable thing about this mental activity, and its resulting product, is its ontological character. For religion is, as a matter of historical and psychological fact, always metaphysical. It is always a naïve or a reasoned theory of reality. It is an attempt to explain human experience by relating it to invisible existences that belong, nevertheless, to the real world. Indeed, monotheism finds in its One and Alone God the Ultimate Reality, the Being from whom all finite beings proceed, on whom they all depend, and to whom they all owe the devotion of their lives in a faithful allegiance. This, however, is ontological doctrine—somehow postulated rationally, or reasoned out, or superstitiously and vainly imagined.

The customary agnostic or sceptical attitude toward the validity of the religious consciousness as ontological is based upon two grounds. Of these the first emphasizes the large part which feeling and imagination play in the construction of the Object of religious belief; and the second points to the dependent and evolutionary character of the conception thus constructed. The conclusion is, that an idea which is so largely the result of unscientific and only half-rational impulses and *motifs*, and which is so plainly a dependent outgrowth of man's historical development, can not have ontological validity.

It is not our present purpose to establish the objective validity, by philosophical discussion, of the conception of the Divine Being, or the Object of religious belief and worship, in any one of its several forms. It is only our purpose to note some of the characteristics of this ontological aspect of the religious consciousness in general, when regarded chiefly from the psychological point of view.

And, first, the facts plainly show that there is something universal and permanent in the constitution of man which furnishes the stimuli and supplies the principles of control in this form of his creative energy. These very reactions upon his physical and social environment themselves need explanation; and the reasonable presupposition is that their complete explanation involves both man's nature and the real nature of his environment as well. This

needed explanation religion attempts to furnish by the doctrine that God, the Ground of both nature and man's life in history, is progressively making men more in His own (the divine) image.

Now we can no more reasonably, and in the name of science and philosophy, quarrel with the evolutionary method in religion than in any other of the several most important forms of the complex progress of the human race. If the religious beliefs, sentiments and cult of humanity were not subjects of development, then religion could never exist in helpful reciprocal relations with man's other developments. But the data of history confirm what a study of human nature suggests as undoubtedly true—namely, that all the various forms of race-culture are most intimately and necessarily related to the activities and products of the so-called religious culture. Industry, politics, science and philosophy, art and morals, all advance or retrograde in dependence upon one another and upon the religious progress or degradation of mankind.

The reciprocal dependence of all these reactions upon the spiritual unity of the race, and upon the particular stages of race-culture, is a general truth established by a study of man's religious history. But all this history shows that the development of religion always carries along with its changing beliefs a certain confidence in its own right to a metaphysics, or a theory of reality, which shall explain those peculiar experiences in which its essential nature, as religion, consists.

This general truth as to the procedure of the religious consciousness may, as has already been indicated, be considered to involve two equally important classes of factors. The first of these is involved in all the exercises of man's cognitive faculty, and in all the growth of knowledge. The psychological principle which is applicable in religion is therefore applicable also in science and philosophy, and in all the practical life of man. The human mind inevitably regards the constructs of its own imagination and intellect as significant and trustworthy representations of the real beings and actual events of the world, whenever such constructs seem necessary for a satisfactory explanation of experience. Religion must explain itself to itself; and its explanations, like all other explanations, must take hold on reality. Physical science does the same thing; and the social sciences are no exception to the same rule. The combined work of imagination and intellect has produced many mythical entities for the explanation of man's experience with concrete things; nor can any one be sure that modern physics and chemistry will not soon find their postulated entities ill-suited to perform the office of explaining the world of widening experience in a wholly satisfying way. But, on the other hand, the vain and ineffectual contortions

of the current phenomenalism in science show plainly how insistent man is upon finding a ground for *his* conceptions and perceptions of things in a world of reality that *is not* dependent upon these conceptions and perceptions. The One Being of the World must, indeed, be more and more looked to, as it were, for the explanation, in reality, of the constructs of both the scientific and the religious imagination. What is sought by both is the completion and harmonizing of the different factors and aspects of man's total experience with himself and with his environment. This ontological belief, or postulate, or reasoned conviction—whichever it may be, or by whatever other name one may elect to call it—is as necessary to the particular sciences or to philosophy, as it is to religion. It is as warrantable in religion as it is in science or philosophy.

The other important fact as to the mode of the procedure of the religious consciousness in its endeavor to teach truth of Reality is its 'anthropomorphizing' character. It is, indeed, customary in discussing the classification of religions and the principles of religious development, to speak of one class as peculiarly 'anthropomorphic.' 'Anthropomorphism' is not infrequently considered to be a somewhat definite stage in the evolution of the religious consciousness. In the more comprehensive, but quite defensible and proper use of all these terms, however, they are applied to every kind and stage of the religious idea. 'Spiritism' constructs its divine beings after the analogy of man's existing knowledge of his own spirit, and projects these constructions into the totem, the fetish, the phenomenon of nature, or physical thing, or into the deceased ancestor. In the shamanism of the Mongolian-Tartar tribes, the nature worship of ancient Egypt, the fetishism of Africa and the South Sea Islanders, the totemism of the Red Skins, and even in the survivals of these lower conceptions and practices found to-day among civilized and Christian, as well as Mohammedan, Brahmanical or Buddhistic communities, the process is the same. Polytheism is, of course, distinctly anthropomorphic in its conceptions of the gods. But so is Pantheism. The Atman of Brahmanism can be conceived of and worshiped as a World-Soul only as the result of the personifying process. Of course, the 'personal' God of Theism is anthropomorphically conceived of; He is the construct of imagination and intellect, in a sort of combined effort to satisfy man's esthetical, ethical and more distinctly religious needs.

What, however, is quite too often forgotten is that the positive sciences are all, of necessity, equally anthropomorphic. Science knows the world, and explains the world as a system of interacting and self-like existences. As I have shown[2] by a searching analysis

[2] In my work called 'A Theory of Reality.'

of all the so-called 'categories,' of which the particular sciences find themselves obliged to make use, every conception of these sciences is derived from an experience with self-like activities, and every relation is stated in terms, as though it were between self-like beings. Natural science is through and through anthropomorphic. Indeed, from the psychological point of view, knowing *is* anthropomorphizing. On this point the Kantian critical philosophy is unanswerable.

But if the metaphysics of physics, and the metaphysics of religion, have their roots in the same psychological process, and stand or fall together when judged by the merits of their psychological genesis and growth, the same thing is not equally true from the ethical and practical points of view. Positivism, or phenomenalism, or agnosticism, in any one of their various forms, does not shock the sentiments and determine practice, to the same extent in science and in religion. A man may, with a certain claim to rationality and a certain satisfaction of his scientific aims, continue in the service of science, undisturbed by either a naïve or a systematic, but agnostic, theory of Reality. If, however, one is convinced that one's conception of the Divine Being is *only* the shadow of one's own fear, or desire, thrown against the background of a wholly unknown and unknowable Reality, then one must either adore one's self, which can cast so substantial a shadow, or one must cease to adore at all. The Object of a truly religious belief and worship must find a place somewhere in the believer's and worshipper's theory of Reality.

Now all this matter, as thus far discussed, concerns only the interest of a psychological investigation into the phenomena of the religious consciousness as ontological. The conclusion is that this form of man's conscious life and conscious, creative activity, *is* ontological; and that the important features of its ontological aspect are such as characterize the use of imagination and intellect in science and in philosophy, as well as in the so-called 'common-sense' operations of daily life. How far this ontological anthropomorphizing, or constructing of a world of reality as a kind of superhuman and yet self-like Being, is rational and critically defensible, psychology can not pronounce. That is a question for philosophy, in its branch of so-called 'Epistemology,' or critical theory of knowledge, to undertake.

One point more, however, deserves more than a passing notice. Both scientific religion—if such a thing there be—and devout science prefer to use somewhat different terms to describe the total attitude of the rational Self toward the religious Object and toward the fundamental entities and laws of the particular sciences. The contrast is more frequently expressed by such terms as 'faith' and 'knowledge.' It might even be said that the goal which intelligence seeks

is a rational faith toward God; but toward the entities and laws of the particular sciences it is certified knowledge at which one should aim. It would be found, on further examination from the psychological point of view, that such a distinction is by no means absolute, even if we confine our attention to the customary opinions and expressions of those who advocate the distinction most strenuously. Such an inquiry, however, involves another set of considerations from that before us at the present time.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

DISCUSSION.

SOME POINTS IN MINOR LOGIC.

A RECENT writer in *Science* slips into a curious error in phraseology. He allows himself to speak of a 'superabundance of physicians going hand in hand with a shortage of patients' as being attributed to, etc. But the superabundance of physicians is the same thing as the shortage of patients (looked at from a different point of view), and a thing can not go hand in hand with itself. This is a sort of lapse which is not infrequent—to make the mistake of supposing that 'There are too many physicians for the patients' and 'There are too few patients for the physicians' are two different statements, instead of being two different forms of one and the same statement. The standardization in logic of the phrases 'same or different statement,' 'same or different form of statement,' would conduce very much to clearness in the treatment of equivalent propositions, where it is in general, of course, a question of a change in the figured copula (see 'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,' article 'Proposition'), instead of, as above, a change of aspect. For instance:

$$(1)\begin{cases} \text{All } a \text{ is } b, \\ \text{None but } a \text{ is } b, \\ \text{No } a \text{ is } b, \\ \text{All but } a \text{ is } b, \end{cases}$$

are all different statements, while

$$(2)\begin{cases} \text{None but the brave deserve the fair,} \\ \text{All who are not brave do not deserve the fair,} \\ \text{None deserve the fair who are not brave,} \\ \text{All but the brave are undeserving of the fair,} \end{cases}$$

are all different forms of one and the same statement. The term

proposition has a certain vagueness of meaning in this connection: there is a sense—and a very important sense—in which all the members of (2) are one and the same thing; but we should almost hesitate to say that even

there is some *a* which is *b*,
there is some *b* which is *a*,

are one and the same *proposition*. Hence the need of the term *statement*—we feel instinctively that in this word we have reference to the very essence of the thing said, to that which gives it its distinctive value as a particular description of the universe.

The error here referred to may be regarded as a sort of minor fallacy; it is perhaps deserving of a name, since to name a fallacy conduces, no doubt, to the avoiding of it. This might, *faute de mieux*, be called the fallacy of taking one to be two.

There is an error of an opposite kind which also needs to be avoided. I once had, at table, this little conversation with a child of eight. We had begun to express our impatience at waiting too long for our next course, while our waiter was to be seen attending to some other people; she said: 'But how do you know that it is our waiter?' I replied (too carelessly, a little impatient at her lack of observation), 'For two reasons: because we have been on this ship for three days, and because I have eyes.' But she said, after a moment's reflection (being better at reasoning than at observing), 'That is not two reasons—it is only one reason.' This was rather an acute observation for so young a child—a detection of the fallacy of taking to be two things what are merely the two elements of one thing.

It was the same child who, at the age of four, when I said 'If you are good this morning I will take you down-town with me this afternoon,' was wont to ask me 'And only?' It would be a distinct safeguard against the danger of committing the fallacy of the wrong conversion if, instead of taking the reverse statement for granted, the habit should become widespread of always stopping to ask 'And only?' The statements All *a* is *b* and Only *a* is *b* (= None but *a* is *b* = all *b* is *a*) are together equivalent to the statement that *a* and *b* are of coincident application; but each is in need of independent investigation, and there is nothing that the inconsequent reasoner is so likely to overlook as this fact. One of the psychologists has lately said: If *a* is *b*, *c* is *d*; and, *by implication*, if *c* is *d*, *a* is *b*. The habit of remembering that 'Only if *a* is *b* is *c d*' must be the answer to a separate question had not become, with him, ingrained.

A still earlier instance of reasoning occurred when this same child was only three. I was doing something which she wished me not to

do, and she said, 'Don't do that!' I said (thinking the logic was good enough for her), 'Must I do everything you want me to do?' and she replied (again after a moment's pause for reflection), 'No, but you must not do anything that I don't want you to do.' Her point, I know, was not so much that one rule held, in our relation with each other, and the other did not, but rather the purely logical consideration that the major premise which was required to justify my implied protest was the second statement and not the first. I have more than once mentioned this incident to people who were not at all noted for lack of intelligence, and found that they were far from being alert in perceiving that there is any difference between the two statements. If I had said, 'Must I do the things you want me to do, and *only* such things,' her logical sense would not have been offended.

I may mention one more instance of an early interest in logic. It was six months earlier that this child woke up one morning, and, for no particular reason, began calling her mamma Frary. But Frary was the name which she had been giving to the cook, whose real name was Mary. So presently she exclaimed, 'But the cook is Frary!—then mamma is the cook!' This was a piece of reasoning which was performed not for any practical purpose which the conclusion could serve, for the conclusion was manifestly absurd, but for pure interest in the sport. It is probably the earliest instance on record of an interest in the syllogistic form as such.

I am reminded of these instances at this time, because the young lady is now nineteen years old who showed such an early acuteness in questions of logic, and when I took her this sentence the other day about 'a superabundance of physicians going hand in hand with a shortage of patients,' she failed to detect, of her own accord, that there is anything curious about it. Must this be taken to mean that education has a deadening influence upon one's native reasoning powers?

CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN.

THE THIRD MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

THE American Philosophical Association held its third meeting in Murray-Dodge Hall, Princeton University, on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, December 29–31, 1903. There were morning and afternoon sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday, and a morning session on Thursday. At the afternoon session on Tuesday, President Woodrow Wilson welcomed the association to Princeton

and the president of the association responded to the address. The members of the association were entertained by Dean and Mrs. Fine at tea, on Tuesday afternoon, at the Jonathan Edwards House, and were received by President and Mrs. Wilson in the evening at 'Prospect.' The president of the association, Professor Josiah Royce, delivered his address Wednesday evening on 'The Eternal and the Practical.' It was a critical discussion of pragmatism. Professor Royce aimed to show, with his characteristic felicity and skill, the impossibility of a pure pragmatism and its need of supplementation from the philosophy of absolutism. The address was followed by a smoker at the Princeton Inn and an informal discussion in which the members from Chicago were invited to take a special part. At the business meeting on Wednesday afternoon the following officers were elected: President, Professor George Trumbull Ladd, Yale University; Vice-President, Professor Frank Thilly, the University of Missouri; Secretary-Treasurer, Professor H. N. Gardiner, Smith College; Executive Committee, new members, Professor James H. Tufts, Chicago University, and Professor H. Heath Bawden, Vassar College. The other members of the Executive Committee are Professor William A. Hammond, Cornell University, and Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Columbia University.

The sessions were well attended and the papers were discussed with considerable interest and fullness. The following papers were read:

On the Relation of Appreciation and Scientific Descriptions of Values: Professor WILBUR M. URBAN.

Objection was taken to the idea that values are not communicable because based on attitudes of mind and hence not describable. It was urged rather that every description involves appreciation and that every new appreciation involves description. But it is not necessary that description should always be the same in kind. We may recognize appreciative description which aims at ideal constructions whereby worth experiences can be communicated, and scientific description which, abstracting from worth experiences in the interest of causal connection, aims at constructing a system of nature. Both kinds of description have the same point of departure, namely, concrete experience, and worth experiences may be described as facts in the order of nature. Their real significance is not thus revealed, however, but only in relation to the total attitude of the individual. Scientific description finds that the nature of the abstractions it has to make is determined by uniformities in appreciative description.

Purpose as a Logical Category: Professor JAMES E. CREIGHTON.

This paper is an examination of the current 'pragmatic' or 'teleological' view that regards thought as an instrument that finds

its function in the realization of the practical ends of life. The main arguments by which this theory is at present supported are discussed and criticised, and the chief difficulties and assumptions of the position developed and exhibited. These difficulties are enumerated under the following heads: (1) The ambiguity in the pragmatic use of the term 'practical purpose'; (2) the necessary individualism and subjectivism in the position; (3) its failure to afford any principle by which experience can be unified; (4) the dualism between 'antecedent experience' and 'reflective thought.' The general conclusion of the paper is that pragmatism is only possible *within* the logical and ontological position that it supposes itself able to supersede.

A Thesis: Hegel's Voyage of Discovery reaches as its Goal an Insight into the Necessity of Goodness and Righteousness in an Absolute Being and into the Consequent Necessity that the Absolute has the Form of Personality: Dr. WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

Dr. Harris developed this thesis by an examination of various passages from the writings of Hegel.

Jonathan Edwards: Professor ALEXANDER T. ORMOND.

The philosophical inheritance of Edwards was first discussed and his direct and indirect dependence on historical philosophy exhibited. Edwards' philosophical creed was then sketched. The key to its exposition was found in the identification by Edwards of God's decrees and God's activity in realizing them. The latter may involve an historical process but this is but the expression of God's eternally active decreeing.

General Discussion on the Question: What place has Esthetics among the Disciplines of Philosophy? Professor GEORGE SANTAYANA, Professor WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, Dr. ETHEL D. PUFFER, Professor F. C. SHARP.

Professor Santayana claimed that although it would be easy to delineate any sort of esthetic field ideally, actual esthetic interests can not be covered by any one discipline. Esthetic judgment and poetic activity are in their living interest prior to psychology. Nor is there a separable branch of ideal science called esthetics. The discipline can not be a branch of ethics, for esthetic values remain valuable in isolation from rational goods. A separate esthetic science is, therefore, impossible. There may be a psychological description of esthetic experience in its natural conditions, and an art of rational criticism in which esthetic values are compared and judged according to the contribution they make, directly or indirectly, to all human good.

Professor Hammond gave a brief statement of the historical differentiation of the discipline of esthetics from the other branches of philosophy, and then discussed in particular its relation to psychology, ethics, sociology and metaphysics. He laid emphasis on its character as a subject-object science, and pointed out that it was consequently impossible to give a correct account of esthetic experience by dealing exclusively with the subject or object of such experience.

Dr. Puffer pointed out the failure of empirical and genetic methods in psychology and sociology to give an adequate definition of beauty. These methods usually attempt a definition in terms of pleasure, but do not show what it is in the object which gives the pleasure. A definition should be attempted from a philosophical point of view, and this in spite of the frequent demand for immediate application of the definition to specific cases. Failure to meet this demand does not necessarily impair the value of the definition, because direct application to specific cases is not to be regarded as the essential thing in a definition. To form a definition of beauty, the end which beauty serves should first be noted. This is expressed in the historic conception that beauty brings about a reconciliation between the strivings of the individual and his world. The conditions of this reconciliation in the individual are an inhibition of action together with a heightening of tone. It is the aim of esthetic science to discover the characteristics of objects which lead to this result.

Professor Sharp urged that a large proportion of the problems of esthetics are admittedly psychological in nature. The objections raised against merging esthetics into psychology are two: (1) The alleged existence of a standard of beauty, the recognition of which is held to constitute esthetics a normative science; (2) the alleged impossibility of explaining the nature of beauty without the aid of metaphysics. With regard to (1), it can be shown that a standard of beauty is indeed within the range of possibility, if beauty be defined so as to remove the inconsistencies in the common use of the word. But the nature of such a standard can be exhibited and its existence demonstrated by methods that are purely psychological. As for (2), every so-called metaphysical deduction of beauty worthy of serious consideration turns out to be in reality the outcome of a psychological analysis, and is taken to be other than it is solely through a confusion of thought.

The Concept of Consciousness: Dr. RALPH BARTON PERRY.

The term consciousness is currently used to denote a real characterization of that to which it is implied. It is extended often so universally, however, that it fails to distinguish anything, for to apply consciousness to everything robs the term of genuine meaning.

It is urgently necessary, therefore, to determine the field in which the term has appropriate use. This field would appear to be psychology, because the psychologist is the scientist who makes consciousness the peculiar and special object of investigation. The term in its current use in other fields of inquiry, notably in subjective idealism, seems to yield confusion rather than clearness.

The Analysis of Consciousness: Dr. GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY.

Analysis is not mere division, but should preserve the integrity of the whole and the mutual relation of parts. This is done, for instance, by the mathematical analysis into x and y functions in a system of coordinates. This conception of analysis avoids pluralism and best represents the meaning of analysis wherever used effectively. In applying this conception to consciousness, consciousness itself must be the primary point of departure, rather than the word experience or the phrase 'the given.' In such an analysis we must not confuse with the whole of consciousness one of the elements found in it. The parts are abstract in relation to the whole. The subject which results from the analysis into subject and object, is not the supporter for the whole experience. The ego must be distinguished from the epistemological subject. The subject can be examined quite as well as the object, because the individual consciousness is doing the examining.

The Meaning of the Psychical from the Standpoint of the Functional Psychology: Professor H. HEATH BAWDEN.

The psychical is the process of experience as contrasted with its content. This process is always a relatively tensional phase of experience in which action is undergoing reconstruction. In logical terms, the psychical is the copula. The psychical (*i. e.*, this process of reconstruction) is not as such the object-matter of psychology. The datum of psychology must be content, not process. The attempt to state process converts it into content. The psychological analysis of the content of experience—the structural analysis—must be interpreted in terms of its value for the process, however, and this interpretation is the main import of the functional psychology. The content of consciousness is essentially social in character. The psychical individual simply represents the focusing of the larger system of social experience in one mode of reconstruction. Psychology, to use Professor Dewey's language, 'is the attempt to state in detail the machinery of the individual considered as the organ or instrument of social progress.'

Some Peculiar States of Consciousness: Professor JAMES H. LEUBA.

Under this title Professor Leuba discussed faith as a special state of consciousness. It is to be distinguished from the intellec-

tual assent called belief, although it contains intellectual as well as conative and affective elements, and it is not confined to religious experience. Instances of the faith consciousness, as in John Wesley, were examined in order to ascertain the proper characterization and conditions involved. Faith is usually preceded by a period of expectation and longing, and when it is attained it constitutes a sustained emotion, often involving great activity and acuteness of perception, but excluding from the possessor's interests whatever is incongruous with it. It is different from all other emotions, especially the emotion of love. Platonic love is, however, probably the same as faith.

The Resemblance of Twins in Mental Traits: Professor E. L. THORNDIKE.

Professor Thorndike, in a preliminary report of a study of the mental resemblances of twins,[1] stated the results of thirteen tests of thirty-five pairs of twins. The coefficients of correlation ranged from .60 to .80. The results appeared to the author to give indubitable proof of the influence of heredity upon mental traits. Not much of the resemblance found could be attributed to similarity of training, since the resemblance was nearly as great in the case of traits little subject to the influence of training as in the case of those much more so. So far as the measurements went, mental capacities seemed approximately as much due to inborn qualities as are physical traits. The opinion that twins are divided sharply into two classes, those nearly identical and those little, if any, more alike than ordinary siblings is opposed by the facts. Both in stature and in the mental traits studied the resemblances shade off continuously from great to less. The embryological theories based on the supposed sharp division appear to need critical examination. Mental resemblance appears, largely independent of physical resemblance, the twins who were most closely similar in appearance, not being so in mental traits. Even among the mental traits there is a decided specialization, resemblance in one trait not being at all closely correlated with resemblance in others.

The Establishment of Association in Hermit Crabs: Dr. EDWARD G. SPAULDING.

Dr. Spaulding reported the results of experiments on the powers of hermit crabs to learn from experience. The experiments were made at the Woods Hole Laboratory with the aid of the Carnegie Institution. The power to modify behavior so as to form new and lasting habits of response to certain stimuli was demonstrated and

[1] This study was made possible by a grant from the Esther Herrman Research Fund of the New York Scientific Alliance.

roughly measured. The learning consisted not of the selection of one from several reactions favored by inborn constitution, but of a less favorable case for acquisition, namely, a response contrary to one strong native tendency, positive heliotropism, and favored only by the tendency to approach a sensed food supply. The crabs learned to go from a light to a dark section of the aquarium through two openings in a screen. After the association between the situation 'food and screen inserted' and the response 'going through opening in screen' had been established, the crabs reacted similarly to a presentation of only a part of the stimulus, namely, the insertion of the screen. This Dr. Spaulding held could be interpreted as a response to a representative or imagined stimulus.

The Scholastic Notion of the Infinite: Rev. L. VAN BECELAERE, O.P.

After pointing out the distinction between the infinite in the sense of a something with undetermined limits (negative infinite) and the infinite with no limits (positive infinite), Father van Becelaere gave the scholastic answers to the problems of the origin of the idea of the infinite and of the objective existence of the infinite. The idea of the infinite was rated among the acquisitions of experience. The actuality of the infinite as a limitless object existing at any one time was denied by St. Thomas for the reason that, being made up of countable parts, it was itself limited. This argument has been denied conclusive force by some scholastic writers, and St. Thomas himself was at times apparently willing to allow its lack of perfect adequacy or at least was conscious that it could be regarded as inadequate by others. The possibility of an infinite series was conceded by the scholastics.

The Law of Veracity: a Study in Practical Ethics: Professor GABRIEL CAMPBELL.

Can we justify Kant's pronouncement as to the absolute valuation of truthfulness? Ethnic appreciations are anomalous. Jurisprudence is most exacting. Man takes refuge in the fictitious. Even warfare is becoming scientific, truthful. A lie to save life would be based on mere presumption. The question as to risk would always be open. Intelligence can not lie. Freedom needs a perfect moral system; religion, absolute sincerity; public life, faith in man.

The Chief Factors in the Formation of the Moral Self: Professor JAMES H. TUFTS.

The elements found in the moral consciousness may be due to three sources: (*a*) Natural selection, operating in connection with variation and heredity, gives the instincts which furnish the stuff or content of life, and also provides the intelligence which is to control, and the emotional capacity which forms a factor in evaluating

ends and reinforcing or inhibiting action. (*b*) Social heredity and education, using the former term for the so-called 'imitation' and the latter for the positive influence through praise and blame, ceremonial and art. This may lift the child to the level of the preceding generation, but can not give progress. (*c*) Progress must come through active reflection on some experience or situation, and a consequent rising to meet it. The factors which develop character and progress are to sought, on the one hand, in the economic, intellectual and artistic development of civilization, and, on the other, in the social environment. Religion reinforces both factors. Progress through natural selection is by a 'back-door' method; through social heredity and education it is by a 'front-door' method, and such progress is transmitted through social heredity and education.

The Summum Bonum: Professor E. B. McGilvary.

The good is that object of desire which does not subsequently awaken an overbearing regret. The *summum bonum* is either the single greatest good (*supremum bonum*) or the series of greatest goods which, taken as a series, is of all competing series the most desirable (*bonum consummatum*). The common elements of various *bona consummata* constitute the common good, which consciously or unconsciously exerts a controlling influence on morality.

Intensity: Dr. Wilmon H. Sheldon.

When the instances of intensity cited by scientists are examined, they are all found to consist of transitive facts, as for example, sensations, velocities, temperatures. It would appear that intensity resides in such facts only. Transitive facts may differ in amount, may be regarded as equal or as more or less, but they are incapable of measurement because measurement involves superposition. Only the permanent can be superimposed. This lack of measurably distinguishes intensities from extensive quantities. As transitive facts are the changes in the world, intensities are to be regarded as causal factors.

The Present Want of an Educational Ideal: Rev. Dr. Frank Sewall.

The elective system leads to waste of educational energy and only emphasizes the need of an educational ideal felt alike by students and faculties. Education is futile without ideals as controlling ends. Dr. Sewall enumerated the ideals of the past and found in mechanism and commercialism the ideals of the present. As these latter do not educate, new ideals must be set up. In attempting to form new ideals, it must be noted that all real control is now subjective and that religion and philosophy must be constructive

forces. These demand a personal ideal and the law of service as the moral law of the universe.

The Interpretation of Aristotle, Met. Z. 4. 1029 b 23–1030 a 6: Professor W. ROMAINE NEWBOLD.

The passage deals with the question whether there can be a real definition of that which corresponds to the phrase 'white man.' The difficulties in interpretation are to be removed in part by emendation of the text. The passage recognizes two kinds of faulty definition, the second of which is applicable to the case in question. There can be no real definition of 'white man,' because the content to thought of the phrase is different from that of the object, and its use as the predicate of a proposed definition is an attaching to the thing itself of a predicate different from it.

Dr. Cloyd N. McAllister made a preliminary report to the association on Thursday morning, of investigations on movements of the eyes made at the Psychological Laboratory of Yale University.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE.

Experimental Psychology and its bearing upon Culture. GEORGE M. STRATTON. New York, The Macmillan Co. 1903. Pp. 338.

As the title implies, the author's purpose is to point out some of the principal results achieved by experimental psychology, and to determine their deeper implications. On this account the book is quite as interesting from the standpoint of philosophy as from that of pure psychology.

The subjects treated are these: The beginnings of experimental psychology; the character of the experiments and their distinction from those of physiology; the possibility of mental measurements; the unconscious; illusions and their significance; experiments on mental space, particularly the space of the blind; the harmonies and discords of space-perception and its place in experience (the relations between visual and tactual space, non-Euclidean perceptions); memory; imitation and suggestion; the elements of art; the connection of mind and body; spiritual implications of the work.

In a certain sense the book is popular; for the topics are such as are of interest to most educated people, the different chapters are practically independent of each other, and the language is not technical. Yet Professor Stratton digs well below the surface, and his discusions are so luminous and so sane, his illustrations and experiments so well-chosen, his sense of the topic so keen, that the expert will find much to profit by. The style is self-restrained and yet full of warmth and vividness. Best of all, perhaps, one can not help finding a certain moral fiber behind it

all, and modesty and absolute fairness and frankness; to say nothing of ingenuity and sense of proportion and the turn of humor that lightens things up every now and then.

As a text-book this work can be used successfully even with elementary students. The better ones amongst them appreciate it thoroughly, and though the others find it hard at first, they get a great deal out of it. Yet the instructor must be on his guard; for it reads so easily with him that he is likely to forget how much it sometimes takes for granted. The discussion of the relations of mind and body is not much use to a student who assumes throughout it all that mind and brain are the same.

Such criticisms as we have to offer are concerned with minor points.

In the first place the monist may fairly complain of some neglect, for while it is suggested (p. 290) that certain objections to parallelism might be removed by monism, the author gets into a discussion of idealism without first telling how this could be done. The discussion of the possibility of mental measurements is, perhaps, not so well thought out as some of the others. The claim that every mental phenomenon is one and indivisible (and that, therefore, mental measurements are impossible) can hardly be answered by saying, 'So is a tree' (p. 48); for though we can not break a large tree up 'into a smaller tree plus a certain increment' we certainly can break both trees up into cordwood or sawdust and get out of one something exactly similar to what we get out of the other plus the increment. In this sense a tree *is* a compound, and a sensation is not. Again, the objection to giving space relations as well as time relations to mental phenomena can hardly be met by the Anselmic argument that 'many space-objects [such as the distorted lines in Zöllner's figure] have their existence only in consciousness' (p. 52); for that simply means that they are fictitious, not that they are parts of the mind. As a matter of fact the psychologist does not measure the space relations of pure fictions; he measures the distortion produced in real objects by mental functions, and that does not imply that the functions themselves are phenomena in space (as they are in time). Thus we may admit that space-measurements are of value to psychology but still persist in 'denying space-attributes to the mind.' Finally, the possibility of hearing several musical tones at once may be sufficient to disprove the doctrine that in time 'experiences can come only in single file'; but it does not prove 'that time itself has more than one dimension' (p. 160); for what are the temporal relations in the dimension of simultaneity that correspond to nearness and distance in the dimension of succession? Are not the relations really the reverse of those assumed in this discussion? The very narrowness of a path in space along which things can come only in single file proves that it has breadth of some sort, while the lack of further temporal relations amongst simultaneous events proves that time has none!

Two errors of proof-reading are worth correcting. On p. 48, margin,

for *quality* read *quantity;* and in p. 303, l. 26, for *immorality* read *immortality.*

H. AUSTIN AIKINS.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS.

MIND. October, 1903. *The Refutation of Idealism:* G. E. MOORE. – Modern idealists all hold that *'Esse is percipi.'* This proposition is insignificant unless understood synthetically; yet if it were thus understood it would not be believed, for 'the idealist maintains that object and subject are necessarily connected mainly because he fails to see that they are *distinct,* that they are *two* at all.' 'The object when we are aware of it is precisely what it would be if we were not aware of it.' The existence of material things is as directly apprehended and, therefore, as certain as the existence of our experiences of them. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism:* C. M. WALSH. – Kant has two conceptions of 'empirical reality.' He describes it first, as simply the actual and possible experiences of finite individuals; second, 'through a lack of definition and a slurring over of distinctions,' he reaches a conception of the empirically real as the object of a *single* experience which is *outside* individual experiences though not *transcending* them. It is this second conception which he used in opposing Berkeley; and it is inconsistent with his first conception as well as with his general doctrines of Transcendental Idealism. *The Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process,* III.: W. MACDOUGAL. – The results of observations and experiments recently made by the author upon the *fading, reappearance and alternation* of visual images, are in accord with his general theory of attention (previously published in *Mind*), 'and justify the assumption that the apparent tract from the intrinsic muscles of either eye is specially connected with the tract leading from the retina of that eye, so that the excitation process initiated in it by contraction of the muscles discharges not only through the motor-circle but in part through the retino-cerebral tract, *augmenting* in the latter the excitement which is directly due to the visual stimulus . . . and also determining the *mode* of attention. . . . How exactly the two tracts are connected . . . we can not yet say.' *The Disjunctive Judgment:* G. R. T. ROSS. – The author maintains with Keynes and against Bradley and Bosanquet 'that it is the function of the disjunctive judgment, both in science and in practical reasoning, to be exhaustive and not necessarily exclusive.' The author's most striking argument is his proof that on the exclusive theory the proposition 'A is either B or C' would be equivalent to the proposition 'A is either not B or not C,' which would in many cases lead to absurdity. Dis-

cussions: *Note on the Philosophy of a Supposition:* W. J. WHITE. – Suppositions or 'conceptions not taken to be true' fall into three classes: (1) Suppositions of art, which are made for their own sake and not for any ulterior end. (2) Suppositions of practice, made for the sake of a desired end and restricted in their application to the controllable aspects of the future. (3) Suppositions of theory, 'hypotheses,' which are subdivided into illustrative and constructive according as the end sought is classification or discovery. *Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn:* A. E. TAYLOR. – The writer defends his criticisms of Mr. Benn's views on early Greek philosophy (*Mind,* N. S., No. 45), against the latter's reply (*Mind,* N. S., No. 46), but disclaims any intention to discredit Mr. Benn's scholarship. Critical Notices: F. W. H. MYERS, *Human Personality and its Survival after Bodily Death:* W. MACDOUGAL. R. B. HALDANE, *The Pathway to Reality: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Session 1902–3:* H. RASHDALL. L. RUSSE, *Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib:* D. MORRISON. J. S. MACKENZIE, *Outlines of Metaphysics:* S. H. MELLONE. New Books; Periodicals; Notes.

REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. September, 1903. *Controversy in Biology:* F. HOUSSAY. – This is due not to ignorance of facts but to the application of opposed categories to facts. One party says that observation denies spontaneous generation; the other, that logical necessity demands it. So too in the conflict about preformation and epigenesis. In our present stage of evolution, categories conflict; as we advance, their meaning will alter till they harmonize. *The Intrinsic Objectivity of Mathematics:* P. BOUTROUX. – Pure mathematics is not syllogistic or empirical, but synthetic. The metaphysical question presses: Is it objective or a free creation? It is a free reconstruction of an ideal objective (not physical) world, for its main concept (correspondence) could not have been constructed by us. *Essay in Ontology:* F. M. – The Universal Spirit (of which we are parts) creates real things and their relations *ex nihilo* by thinking them. We create nature every time we open our eyes. Spirit has two attributes, activity and resistance (the conservative tendency, inertia) which account for all the various characteristics of the outer and inner worlds. – Critical Studies: *Varieties of Religious Experiences by Wm. James:* H. DELACROIX. – This is the best psychological work on religion, but a psychological treatment of religion is insufficient. Religion includes logical, intellectual motives, and is not merely a matter of individual feeling; nor can it be viewed apart from institutionalism. – Practical Questions: *Medical Secrecy:* G. BELOT. – The writer takes issue with Dr. Ch. Valentine on the question: Is a doctor bound to disclose the fact that his patient, about to marry, is syphilitic? If others have a *right* to know this, they have also the *duty* of providing for the patient's care. – Obituary Notices: CH. RENOUVIER. – Philosophy in the Universities, 1903–4. New Books; Periodicals.

De Boer, T. J. *The History of Philosophy in Islam.* Translated by Edward R. Jones. London: Luzac & Co. 7s. 6d.

Eisler, Rudolph. *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe.* Erste Lieferung. Berlin: Ernst Seigfried Mittler & Sohn. 25 m.

Jordan, David Starr. *The Voice of the Scholar, with other Addresses on the Problems of the Higher Education.* San Francisco: Paul Elder & Co. $1.50.

Keller, Helen. *Optimism: An Essay.* New York: T. Y. Crowell & Co. 75 c.

Pearson, Karl. *On the Inheritance of Mental and Moral Characters in Man, and its Comparison with the Inheritance of Physical Characters.* London: Anthropological Institute of Great Britian and Ireland.

Schiller, F. C. S. *Humanism.* New York: The Macmillan Co. 15 + 297 p. 8vo. $2.75.

Selections from the Works of Herbert Spencer. Edited by A. D. Hall. Boston: H. M. Caldwell & Co. $1.00.

Taylor, A. E. *Elements of Metaphysics.* London: Methuen. 16 + 419 p. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Thorndike, E. L. *Educational Psychology.* New York: Lemcke & Buechner. 4 + 177 p. 8vo. $1.50.

NOTES AND NEWS.

In so far as an explanation or even an excuse may be needed for the establishment of a new journal, it is hoped that this may be given by the contents and form of the first number of The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. There are in Germany 'Centralblätter' for nearly all the sciences, and there are in all countries 'trade journals' for the applied sciences such as medicine and engineering. But there exists no journal covering the whole field of scientific philosophy, psychology, ethics and logic, appearing at frequent intervals and appealing directly to the interests of all professional students. It is a matter of importance at the present time that the relations between philosophy and psychology should remain intimate, and that the fundamental methods and concepts of the special sciences, now receiving attention on all sides, should be kept in touch with philosophy in its historic development. What may be accomplished by the prompt publication of short contributions is demonstrated by the *Comptes Rendus* of the Paris Academy, whose four-page articles cover nearly the whole scientific activity of France. A fortnightly journal is particularly suited for discussion, the interval being just long enough to permit of questions and answers. Finally the special function of such a journal is the quick and complete publication of reviews and abstracts of the literature. It sems evident

that a journal on these lines will cooperate with the existing reviews of philosophy and psychology. The plan has received the approval and support of the leading American students of philosophy and psychology.

THE American Psychological Association held last week its meeting at St. Louis under the presidency of Dr. Bryan. Professor William James, Harvard University, was elected for the second time president of the association. This honor was conferred upon him again after a lapse of ten years as an exceptional recognition of the unique place he holds among American psychologists. Professor Münsterberg, Harvard University, and Dr. Henry Rutgers Marshall, New York City, were elected as new members of the council.

A *British Journal of Psychology* will be edited by Professor James Ward and Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, of Cambridge University, with the cooperation of Messrs. W. McDougall, C. S. Myers, A. F. Shand, C. S. Sherrington and W. G. Smith. The first number will be published in January by the Cambridge University Press and the parts will thereafter be issued at irregular intervals, about 450 pages constituting a volume, the price of which is 15s.

THE Wilde readership in mental philosophy at Oxford, vacant by the removal of Mr. G. S. Stout to accept the professorship of logic and metaphysics at St. Andrews, has been filled by the election of Mr. William McDougall, now reader in experimental psychology at University College, London. Dr. W. G. Smith, who was appointed last year to the recently established lectureship on experimental psychology at King's College, London, has resigned to accept a similar position at the University of Liverpool. The council of King's College has elected to the post, Dr. C. S. Myers, of Cambridge. Dr. Smith was some time since instructor at Smith College, and Dr. Myers has recently visited the psychological laboratories of the United States.

AT a meeting of the Trustees of Columbia University, on January 4, 1904, Professor George Stuart Fullerton, of the University of Pennsylvania, was appointed professor of philosophy in Columbia University. Professor Fullerton is at present in Munich engaged in research work.

PROFESSOR KUNO FISCHER, now in his eightieth year, has retired from active duty as professor of philosophy in the University of Heidelberg.

DR. CHAS. H. JUDD has been made acting director of the Yale Psychological Laboratory for the present year. At the same time an advisory committee on the laboratory has been appointed consisting of Professors Ladd, Duncan and Sneath.

WE regret to record the death of Dr. Arthur Allin, head of the department of psychology and pedagogy of the University of Colorado.